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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MINERSVILLE LAND AND
LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
EARL P. STATEN, Administrator of
the Estate of William Story, Jr., deceased, W I L L I A M MacARTHUR
STORY, MARION S. G 0 E L T Z,
FLORENCE M. STORY HAINES,
ELEANOR STORY N 0 WE L S,
FRANK PRYOR, Administrator of
the Estate of Frederick Steigmeyer,
deceased, MRS. F R E D E R I C K
STEIGMEYER, THE STATE OF
UTAH, and all persons unknown
claiming any right, title estate, lien
or interest in the real property descdbed in the complaint adverse to
the plaintiff's ownership or clouding
the plaintiff's title thereto,

Case No. 8662

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and respondent in this court, is
not in agreement with the statement of facts as
set forth in the appellants' brief.
Over the plaintiff's and respondents objection
1
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made in the court below (R. 81, 82) defendants
and appellants prevailed in having the Lower Court
amend the original proposed findings of fact and
particularly finding Number 11 thereof, by the inclusion of what was viewed by the plaintiff as a
great surplusage of evidentiary material, not necessary to the decision. There is no dispute that the
findings made by the court, (R. 102,-106 incl.) and
referred to by the appellant in their brief at Page
2 thereof with approval, are the facts. Nevertheless,
appellants after having cited the courts findings
promptly depart from them in setting forth their ~
argumentive version of the facts. We submit that
basically the facts in this case and as found by the
lower court are as follows :
~
j

The State of Utah was granted by law the
right to select certain federal lands as grants in
aid of the Agricultural College and to sell the land
so acquired by it. One Joseph Henshaw signed an
agreement to purchase selected lands on the 24th I
day of November 1902 and submitted the same ,
in the manner and form required by law to the
State of Utah, accompanied by the requisite payment on deposit, all of which appears from an examination of the Land Board records (R. 51), and
particularly the documents contained therein consisting of excerpts from the Minute Book of the
State Board of Land Commissioners, from the sales

4
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record, and the document entitled "Agreement to
Purchase Selected Land''.
The Agreement to Purchase Selected Land so
filed by Henshaw was duly accepted by the State
on the 3rd day of December 1902 (R. 51) and the
State made the necessary selection of lands and
submitted the same to the United States Land Office on the same day. The United States Land Office
approved the selection on December 16, 1902. Approval by the Washington D.C. land office was had
on December 1, 1904. Thereafter, on the 1st day of
January 1905, certificate of sale #8515 was duly
issued by the State of Utah to Joseph Henshaw (R.
51). On March 30th, 1914, the State of Utah received the final payment constituting payment in
full to the State of Utah of the consideration due
on the purchase of the land under the certificate
aforesaid (R. 17, 18).
Joseph Henshaw died in September 1905 (R.
51, 104). Prior to his death, as shown by the records
of the State Land Board, he transferred his interest
in the Certificate of Sale aforesaid, to one A. B.
Lewis (R. 51). On December 28, 1910, A. B. Lewis,
as shown by land board records ( R. 51 ) , assigned
and transferred the Certificate to Lewisiana Land
Company, which company assigned and transferred
said certificate to William Story, Jr., and Frederick
Steigmeyer, a co-partnership, on August 21, 1914.
3
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None of these assignments were recorded in the
office of the County Recorder of Beaver County.
William MacArthur Story, Marion S. Goeltz, Florence M. Story Haines and Eleanor Story Nowels,
appellants herein, are the assignees and successors
in interest of said William Story, Jr., and Frederick Steigmeyer, a co-partnership. One Gus S. Holmes
having acquired a money judgment in the District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against
A. B. Lewis, procured to be issed to the Sheriff of
Beaver County a writ of execution on March 4,
1914. Under said writ the said sheriff sold at sheriff's sale to said Gus S. Holmes on March 28, 1914,
the interest of A. B. Lewis in the real estate described in said Land Board Certificate. Sheriff's Certificate of Sale of said real estate on execution was
issued March 28, 1914 to Gus S. Holmes, and duly
recorded in the office of the Recorder of Beaver
County (R. 51, Ex. 1 & 2). Thereafter Gus S. Holmes
applied to the State Land Board for issuance of
patent to the lands in question. The application was
resisted by Story and Steigmeyer. (R. 51)
The Land Board sought a determination by the
Attorney General as to whom patent should be issued
and it was the Attorney General's ruling made
in March 1915 that the sale by the Sheriff to Gus
S. Holmes should be ignored and patent issued to
Lewisiana Land Co., upon compliance with certain
4
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conditions. (R. 51) The State Land Board advised
Lewisiana Land Company and Story and Steigmeyer, its attorneys, of the requirements for the
issuance of patent by letter dated July 8, 1915 (R.
51). By its further letter of July 14, directed to the
same parties ( R. 51) it was stated:
"That in addition to the requirement
made in the said letter (referring to the letter
of July 8) you will have the County Treasurer
of Beaver County notify this office of the
redemption of the tax sale for the 1911 and
subsequent years."
An examination of the files of the State Land·
Board with respect to this land and Certificate
#8515, does not reflect that the appellants predecessors in interest ever complied with the requirements and submitted the necessary documents to
permit the State of Utah to issue its formal patent
to the lands in question (R. 51). Nor did the appellants or their predecessors in interest ever pay the
taxes or redeem the tax sales as required. (R. 51,
Ex. 1 & 2, 105-6)
No action was ever taken by the appellants
or their predecessors in interest to correct the
status of the record title to -this land in the
office of the Beaver County Recorder and it
stands as of today, in the order of succession determined by the tax sale by Beaver County of the
5
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interest of Gus S. Holmes, the purchaser at the
sale on execution. (R. 51, Ex. 1 & 2)
The lands in question were assessed by the
County Assessor of Beaver County in the name
of Joseph Henshaw for the years 1906 to 1911
inclusive and in the name of the Estate of Joseph
Henshaw for the years 1912 thru 1916 inclusive
( R. 73-7 4) . In 1917, a portion of this land, namely
the South lf2 of Section 17 was for the first time
assessed in the name of Gus S. Holmes. The remainder was assessed in the name of the estate
of Joseph Henshaw (R. 73,74). From 1918 to 1940,
all of the lands were assessed in the name of Gus
S. Holmes ( R. 73, 74). Taxes assessed against the
lands were not paid and the lands were sold to
Beaver County for non-payment of taxes. On January 2, 1937, an auditors tax deed on the tax sale
was issued to Beaver County and duly recorded
(R. 51, Exhibit 1, Pages 11, 12; Exhibit 2, Page
25). Thereafter in the year 1940, Beaver County
proceeded to foreclose its tax lien in an action commenced in the District Court for Beaver County,
Civil File No. 2060 (R. 106, Finding #11). A default judgment was taken and a sheriff's deed on
foreclosure sale was issued to Beaver County on or
about May 1st, 1941. The plaintiff purchased the
property from Beaver County under contract approved by the County Commissioners of that County
6
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on the 5th day of June 1941 (R. 106). The contract
was paid out by the plaintiff, respondent herein,
and Beaver County gave its deed to the respondent
under date of December 11, 1945 (R. 106, R. 51,
Exhibit 1, Page 16; Exhibit 2, Page 30). Ever
since the date of acquisition under the contract, the
5th day of June 1941, respondent has been in the
exclusive, open, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession and occupancy of all of the said
real property under a claim right and title and has
paid all of the taxes regularly levied and assessed
thereon according to law (R. 68, 75, 106).
The appellants predecessors in title are not
presently and never have at any time been in the
actual possession of the land in controversy, nor
have they received any part of the rents, issues or
profits from said lands ( R. 68) .
Respondent desiring to secure patent to the
lands which it had acquired from Beaver County
as noted above, approached the State Land Board
and after a conference with one of the commissioners and the Land Board attorney, wrote to the Honorable Herbert Smart, Commissioner requesting advice as to the requirements which would be made
by the State in order to enable the respondent to
secure patent. (R. 51, Page 37 of the Land Board
Records) . By letter dated May 17, directed to Allen
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

H. Tibbals, one of the attorneys for respondent,
respondent was advised
"You are advised that if you wish to bring
an action to quiet title in order that the state
may patent the land to the custodians lawfully thereto entitled, it will be necessary for
you to join Mr. Steigmeyer and Mr. Story
or those claiming under them. When this is
completed, the Board will issue patents in ac-cordance with the Decree of the Court." (R.
51, Page 40 of the Land Board Records)."
Action was instituted accordingly by the filing
of the complaint, issuance of summons, and publication of summons thereon (R. 1-16 incl.). The
State of Utah was joined as a party defendant in
order that the court, might be vested with jurisdiction to direct the state to whom to issue patent after
de termination of the issues between the litigants.
The state answered, setting up the fact that the
land had been sold under Certificate of Sale, that
payment in full was received by the State, March
30th, 1914; disclaimed any beneficial interest in or
to the lands in question and further indicated its
willingness to issue patent to the party determined
by the court to be the lawful claimant thereto (R.
17, 18). Details of the various arguments, motions,
etc. before the court appear to be surplusage in this
statement of facts and are not recited for that
reason since appallants raise no issue and do not
assign as error any of the rulings of the court made
on any of the motions.
8
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The statement of facts made by the appellants
in their brief, contains statements not in conformity
with the record which the respondent brings to the
attention of the court as briefly as possible in compliance with Rule 75 (P) (2). Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Appellants state at Page 1 and 2 of their brief:
"This is an appeal by four of the above
defendants from a judgment of the District
Court of Beaver County, the Hon. Will L.
Hoyt, Judge, presiding, quieting title by adverse possession to certain unpatented state
school lands in Beaver County in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant, State of
Utah, holder of legal title * * *".
The judgment of the Trial Court cannot be
truthfully considered adverse to the State of Utah.
The judgment of the Trial Court is adverse to the
appellants who were purchasers of the land from
the State of Utah. Throughout the entire proceedings in this case, in the lower court and also in this
court, appellants have adhered to this same policy
of attempting to identify themselves with the State
of Utah as though they were the State and any
action adverse to them has been classified by them
as being also adverse to the State of Utah. Such is
not the fact. The disclaimer filed by the State (R.
17 and 18), the memorandum decision of Judge
Hoyt ( R. 76) and the decree entered by the Court
(R. 110-111) support the statement by Respondents
9
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that this judgment is not in any sense hostile to
the State of Utah.
Appellants at page 2 of their brief state:
"It was stipuated and the Court found
(Par. 13) neither appellants nor any of their
predecessors in interest have ever, at any
time, under the certificate, taken possession
of the lands from the State, or received any
part of the rents, issues or profits therefrom.
The State has, therefore, never relinquished
either title to or possession of the land to the
purchaser.''
The fact is, that a stipulation was made and
entered into between counsel for the respective
parties to the effect that
"Defendant or defendants, predecessors
in title or any of them and particularly any
person claiming by, through or under William
Story, Jr., and Frederick Steigmeyer, or
either of them are not now and never have at
any time, been seized or in possession of any
part of the lands in controversy herein, or received any part of the rent, issues, or profits
from said lands." ( R. 68, 69)
It was neither stipulated nor did the Court find
as a fact that the State had never relinquished either
title or possession of the land to the purchaser.
Again at Page 2 and 3 of Appellants' brief,
we find included in Appellants' statement of facts
an argumentative analysis of the complaint filed by
respondent in the lower court. This statement is not'
10
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factual, but is purely argumentative. (For the full
text of Appellants' statement see appendices page
51.)

Respondent's complaint was drawn in the form
required to cmnply with the statutory procedure for
quieting title. Since respondent was already in possession and had been since June 5th, 1941 neither
trespass or ejectment appeared appropriate. (R.
17, 18). It should be noted that the sufficiency of the
complaint has never been attacked by the appellants
herein. No issue was raised in the court below,
nor is any made in the assignment of errors or the
statement of points in the appellants' brief with
respect to the sufficiency of the complaint. The
argu1nentative analysis of the plaintiff's complaint made by appellants may or may not be a valid
analysis of the complaint and its function, but under
the circumstances nothing is before this court for
determination with respect to the matter of the
complaint and the statement voluntarily included as
a statement of fact in appellant's brief, we, therefore, respectfully suggest to the court is both misplaced and inaccurate and cannot be considered a
factual statement supported by the record.
We direct the courts attention to the appellants
brief at Page 3 with respect to assessment of taxes
on the lands in question :
"After that time until 1940, they were
erroneously assessed in the name of Gus S.
Holmes, a complete stranger to both land
11
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and certificate, apparently by reason of a
sheriffs certificate of sale on execution issued
March 28, 1914 to Gus S. Holmes against one
A. B. Lewis who on the date of execution
by ruling of the attorney general and decision
of the Land Board, had no interest in either
land or certificate (R. 105, and Land Board
Records R. 51)''. (Italics ours)
The facts in connection with this matter are
that the taxes were actually assessed from 1906
through 1916 in the name of either Joseph Henshaw
or his estate by the Assessor of Beaver County. In
1917, the South :Y2 of Section 17 was assessed in
the name of Gus S. Holmes (R. 74.) In 1918, all
of the lands in question were assessed in the name
of Gus S. Holmes ( R. 74). The statement by the
appellants in their brief as above quoted that the
assessment in the name of Holmes was "erroneous"
as well as their further statement that, "Gus S.
Holmes was a stranger to both land and certificate," are conclusions in which the respondents do
not concur and which cannot be logically drawn
from the evidence before the trial court. The reference by Appellants to the opinion of the Land Board
and of the Attorney General do not strengthen the
conclusions drawn by the Appellants. The Trial
Judge specifically pointed out that he did not believe himself bound by the rulings of the Attorney
General and indicated that he believed them immaterial ( R. 80). He included the fact of the exist12
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ence of these rulings in his findings only as a concession to the defendants theory of the case (R.
80). We believe it significant that the Trial Court
drew no such conclusion as that drawn by the Appellants (R. 106, 107).
In the second full paragraph on Page 4 of the
Appellant's brief, we find the following statement:
"'The Attorney General filed an answer
for the State on May 2nd, 1956 (R. 17), attempting to disclaim on behalf of the State
any "right, title or interest" in the lands and
attempting to renounce any statutory or constiutional duty or obligation of the state in
connection therewith * * *"
It is a fact that the Attorney General, after due
consideration of the matter, by the State Land
Board, and by members of his own staff (R. 51,
Pages 38, 39, 40, 49, and 50) did issue an answer
in which (R. 17, 18), the Attorney General on behalf of the State of Utah sets forth the fact that
in the year 1902, a State Land Certificate #8515
was issued to one Joseph Henshaw for the purchase
of certain described state agrciultural college lands,
being the lands in question in this case, and that on
March 30th, 1914, the State of Utah received final
payment of the purchase of the lands. Therefore, the State of Utah, disclaimed any right, title,
or interest in the lands and indicated it stands ready,
willing and able to issue a patent to the land described upon the final ajudication of the interests of the
13
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persons named as parties defendant. To characterize
this action taken by the Attorney General on behalf
of the State of Utah as "an attempt to renounce any
statutory or constitutional duty or obligation of the
State in connection therewith," as is done by the
Appellant in the statement of facts in their brief,
is manifestly unfair to the Attorney General and
does not fairly or factually characterize the action
taken by the Attorney General.
POINTS RELIED UPON
Appellants set forth their argument in their
brief under points which do not coincide in wording
with the Assignments of Error set forth at page
6 of the appellants' brief. In replying to the Appellants' brief, we shall set forth our argument under
the points as set out in appellants brief, and we are
grouping with the appellants point the Assignment
of error to which we deem the point to relate. It is
noted that there is no point relating to assignment
of error number 4. We have chosen, therefor, to
set out the affirmative of our position on this matter
and discuss the assignment of error under this affirmative statement of the point.
POINT I
STATE AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL LANDS GRANTED TO THE STATE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE HELD IN TRUST FOR THE PEOPLE
TO BE DISPOSED OF AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY
LAW AND RELINQUISHMENT OF TITLE BY THE
STA'TE OTHERWISE THAN BY WAY OF A SALE

14
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AND ISSUANCE OF PATENT TO A PERSON OTHER
THAN A PURCHASER, HIS ASSIGNEE OR SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
VOID AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ENABLING
ACT, THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE
STATE STATUTES PERTAINING TO THE ADMINISTRATION, MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF S'TA'TE
LANDS.

1. The court erred in permitting title to State
Agricultural College School lands received from the
Federal Government to be relinquished by the State
not by purchase but under State Statutes of limitations based on adverse possession, the decree being
unconstitutional and void under the provisions of
the Enabling Act, the Utah State Constitution and
the statutes pertaining to the administration, disposal and sale of such state lands.
POINT II
UNDER UTAH LAW POSSESSION OF LANDS
CANNOT BE ADVERSE PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF
PATENT.

The Court erred in holding that adverse possession under State statutes of limitations commences to run not from the date of issuance of the
patent but from the date of final payment of the
State Land Certificate.
POINT III
THE COURT WILL NOT LEND ITS AID IN A
SUIT BASED ON A DEED ACQUIRED BY MALFEASANCE OF PUBLIC OFFICE.

The Court erred in holding that a quiet title
decree may be based on an official abuse of public
trust and malfeasance of office.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ORDER THE STATE TO ISSUE PATENT TO

15
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THE APPELLANTS AS PURCHASERS OF THE LAND
FROM THE STATE BUT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF PATENT.

The Court erred in refusing to order the State
to issue patent to appellants as purchasers of the
land from the State.
(Italics are ours and used to indicate the assignment of error by the appellant as set forth in
Page 6 of their brief. Though no point 4 appears
in appellants brief, we have chosen to set forth the
affirmative of our position on the matter as our
point 4.)
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
In its argument respondent will set forth its
position in this matter essentially under the points
as presented in the brief of the appellant with notation thereunder of the assignment of error to which
we believe the point relates. The entire situation in
the presentation of respondent's side of this case
is unusual in that there is no essential disagreement
between appellants and respondent as to the law
and it will be noted that both parties cite many of
the same cases in support of their respective theories
of the case. It is primarily the position of the respondent that the appellants incorrectly interpret and
misapply the existing law and do not recognize the
facts as they actually exist. We believe that this
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situation can be clearly pointed out to the court in
the course of the argument.
POINT I
STATE AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL LANDS GRANTED TO THE STATE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE HELD IN TRUST FOR THE PEOPLE
TO BE DISPOSED OF AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY
LAW AND RELINQUISHMENT OF TITLE BY THE
STATE OTHERWISE THAN BY WAY OF A SALE
AND ISSUANCE OF PATENT TO A PERSON OTHER
THAN A PURCHASER, HIS ASSIGNEE OR SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
VOID AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ENABLING
ACT, THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE
STATE STATUTES PERTAINING TO THE ADMINISTRATION, MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF STATE
LANDS.

1. The court erred in permitting title to State
Agricultural College School lands received from the
Federal Government to be relinquished by the State
not by purchase but under State Statutes of limitations based on adverse possession, the decree being
unconstitutional and void under the provisions of
the Enabling Act, the Utah State Constitution and
the statutes pertaining to the administration, disposal and sale of such state lands.
Appellants correctly state the law in Point I
of their brief as follows:
"State Agricultural School lands granted
to the State by the Federal Government are
held by the State in trust for the people to be
disposed of as may be provided by law and
the relinquishment of title by the State in any
other manner than by sale and issuance of
patent to a person becoming the purchaser
thereof would indeed be unconstitutional and
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void and in contravention of the Enabling Act
and in violation of the State constitution and
statutes relating to administration and management of state lands."
The only claim which appellants have to the
lands in question is as purchasers of state lands
from the State in accordance with law and the Constitution. The attempt by appellants to characterize
the disposition of these lands as having been made
by the state in a manner other than that authorized
by law is not in accordance with facts. Joseph Henshaw, one of the predecessors in title of the appellants, made a proper selection in the manner required by law, of state lands granted to the State by the
Federal Government in aid of the Agricultural College ( R. 51) . Joseph Henshaw and his successors
in interest, paid the State of Utah the full consideration for these lands (R. 17, 18, 51). The State received the final payment on March 30, 1914 (R.
17, 18, 51). The State was then left at this point
vested with only the naked legal title to this land
impressed with the right by Joseph Henshaw and
his successors in interest to the issuance of patent
from the state upon compliance with the necessary
formalities to show their true succession to Joseph
Henshaw's interest and the payment of taxes as
required by state law. There is no irregularity cited
by the appellants from the beginning to the end of
their brief or in any of the proceedings before the
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lower court, in the action of the State of Utah
through its designated officials in making the sale
to Joseph Henshaw, in accepting the payment thereon, or in the distribution of the funds received therefrom. The entire procedure was regular and proper.
What the appellant seeks to do is to invest Joseph
Henshaw and his successors in interest with immunity from the intervening claims of others to the
lands which he thus bought from the state, and to
do so the appellant seeks to confuse the issue by
attempting to make it appear that the State of Utah
is an in teres ted party in this action by reason of
the fact that the ministerial function of the issuance of patent has not yet been carried out, and that
respondents action is perforce adverse to the state.
The action brought here by respondent against
the appellants is one in which the State is joined
merely because it holds the naked legal title to the
land in question. It is not an action adverse to
the state. The mere fact that the state holds naked
legal title does not preclude respondents from the
perfection of an adverse title against the appellants.
We believe the following quotation from American
Jurisprudence on the subject clearly states the law:
"* * * 'The holder of a receipt or certificate of purchase from the state is the equitable owner of the land and indefeasibly entitled to a patent; such receipt or certificate
is inchoate evidence of an absolute title, the
state then being merely a naked trustee of the
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legal title, which it is bound to convey to such
equitable owner on demand, and it has no
right thereafter to sell and convey the land
to another * * *". - 42 Am. Jur., PUBLIC
LANDS P. 857,8 Sec. 80.
The California case of Z. Russ & Sons Co. vs.
Crichton, Tax Collector, 49 P. 1043 holds:
"The state owned the lands, and when,
on payment of a part of the purchase price,
it issued its certificates of purchase therefor,
an equitable title vested in the purchasers,
which was subject to assessment for taxes.

* * *"

Corpus Juris Secundum- PUBLIC LANDS
- Vol. 73, Page 884, Sec. 242 states the rule:
"A certificate of purchase does not pass
the legal title, but such title remains in the
state until the patent issues; but where, on
payment of part of the purchase price of
state lands, a certificate of purchase is issued
by the state, an equitable title to the land
vests in the purchaser. * * *"
The Supreme Court of the United States has
held in the case of Barney vs. Dolph, 97 US 652,
24 L. Ed. 1063:
"Where the right to a patent has become
vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is
equivalent, so far as the government is concerned, to a patent actually issued. The execution of and delivery of a patent after the
right to it has become complete are the mere
ministerial acts of the officers charged with
that duty."
Being thus vested with the absolute equitable
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

title, can the interest of the appellants be subject
to adverse possession by others? Again there seems
to be no dispute in the law on this matter.
"In the absence of legislation providing
otherwise, the Statute of Limitation does not
run against the Government, and, therefore,
title to public lands cannot be acquired by adverse possession either as against the United
States or as against any of the several states,
in some of which there are constitutional
and statutory provisions to this effect. This
rule, however, has no application in litigation
where the state is only a nominal party, its
name being used merely for the enforcement
of the rights of third persons who alone will
enjoy the benefits. * * * Even where the
statute does not run against the government,
one '11ULY acquire rights in public lands by adverse occupancy against all third persons,
and this is true .even though the claimant admits the governments ownership, in other
words, the claimant's possession may be adverse without being hostile to the government." 1 Am. Jur. Adverse Possession P. 8489 Sec. 104. (Italics ours)
In the case of Fear vs. Barwise, Kansas 93
Kan. 131, 143 P. 505, the above quoted phrase from
American Jurisprudence is quoted from its original
source, Ruling Case Law, with approval at Page 507
of the opinion.
We submit that these authorities outline the
position of the respondents in this case. We do not
make, and never have made any claim hostile to the
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State of Utah. This fact is recognized by the plead..
ing filed by the attorney general (R. 17, 18) but we
do claim adverse possession under claim of right and
ti tie against the appellants. This very vi tal fact is
the one which distinguishes this case from all of the
authorities cited by appellants and makes the authorities cited by appellants in their brief inapplicable.
The Utah law specifically requires that upon
the issuance of a certificate of sale by the State
Land Board the County Assessor in the County in
which the lands so sold or covered by the certificate
of sale may lie shall assess the interest of the purchaser under the certificate of sale to the extent
of the money paid or then due. (Sec. 59-2-2 UCA
1953, R.S. 1898 & 1907 S 2502, Also see Stowell
vs. State 100 U. 420-115 P. 2d 914).
The assessments made as indicated by therecords of Beaver County and incorporated in the
stipulation between the parties hereto ( R. 73, 74)
were made by the Beaver County Assessor in accordance with law in the name of Joseph Henshaw
and subsequently in the name of his estate thru the
year 1916.
'The laws of Utah 1919 Chapter 113, Sec. 1,
added to the law the following:
''And provided further that where final
payment has been made upon such lands the
contract of sale shall, for the purpose of taxation, be regarded as passing title to the pur22
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chaser or assignee, and the Secretary of the
land board shall immediately certify the receipt of such final payment to the Assessor
of the county where such lands are located,
and the assessor shall thereupon place such
lands upon the assessment roll of such county."
Prior to the time of final payment to the state
under the certificate March 30th, 1914 (R. 17, 18)
and the time of inclusion of the lands as such on the
assessment roll, it appears that one Gus S. Holmes
acquired a money judgment in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and proceeded
to have the same abstracted and docketed in Beaver
County and the Sheriff of Beaver County was thereupon instructed to levy execution on the lands in
question and sell so much thereof as necessary to
satisfy the execution. ( R. 105). Gus S. Holmes
bought the lands at the execution sale. (R. 105) Gus
S. Holmes properly recorded the certificate of sale
and Sheriff's deed, with the Recorder of Beaver
County, Utah. (R. 51, Ex. 1 P. 8) (R. 51 Ex. 2 P. 8).
Though the predecessors in interest to appellants
proceeded to contest the right of Gus S. Holmes
to issuance of patent (R. 51) before the State Land
Board, and succeeded in getting an opinion from
the Attorney General that the assignment made by
A. B. Lewis, to the Lewisiana Land Company of the
Certificate of Sale No. 8515, was valid and defeated
the rights of Gus S. Holmes as against A. B. Lewis
as an individual, nothing was ever done to correct
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the status of the record in Beaver County in the
office of the Recorder thereof, or in the office of
the Assessor. (R. 51, Ex. 1, & 2, and R. 73, 74).
Therefore, when as required by law the Assessor,:
included the lands on the assessment roll he did so'
from the year 1917, as to the South lf2 of Sec. 17,
and from the year 1918 on all of the lands in the
name of Gus S. Holmes. This is in accordance with
the law. The Utah law, Section 59-5-12 UCA 1953
originally appearing in the 1898 Revised Statutes
as Section 2524 provides:
''* * * If the name of the owner or claimant of any property is known to the Assessor
or if it appears of record at the Office of the
County Recorder where the property is situated, the property must be assessed in such
name; if unknown to the assessor and if it
does not appear of record as aforesaid, the
property must be assessed to unknown owners."
The assessment in the name of Gus S. Holmes
was a strict compliance by the Assessor with the
law quoted. Thus we find the lands properly assessed
in the name of Gus S. Holmes. When the taxes were
not paid the County thereafter caused the same to
be sold for delinquent taxes and ultimately the respondent became the purchaser from the county, ~
thereby acquiring color of title. ( R. 51, Ex. 1 P.
1112, 13, 14, 15, 16; & Ex. 2 P. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 30) The respondent immediately entered

j
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into possession of the lands upon entering into the
contract with Beaver County for acquisition of title
on June 5th, 1941, and ever since said date has occupied the lands under claim of right, openly, adversly, exclusively, continuously and uninterruptedly
and paid all taxes regularly levied and assessed
thereon according to law. (R. 68, 69, 75, 106 Finding 12.)
That the Appellants were entitled to possession
under the certificate of sale and that respondents
holding of the land in question was therefor adverse to the appellants we believe is established by
the following cases.
It is the established and recognized law of this
state that the purchaser under a certificate of sale
issued as in this case, is entitled to the immediate
possession of the land, could enter upon the land,
cultivate it, improve it and was entitled to any crops
produced thereon. We specifically refer to the case
of Young vs. Corless found at 56 Utah 564, 191
Pac. 64 7 decided by the Utah Supreme Court in the
year 1920. In that case the Supreme Court stated:
"* * * Under the certificates of sale and
the law authorizing the issuance of the same,
the purchaser was entitled to immediate possession, and could enter upon the land, cultivate it, improve it, and was entitled to any
crops produced thereon. * * *" (Young vs.
Corless 56 Utah 564; 191 Pac. 647)
That this is the effect of a certificate of sale
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is also recognized in the later case of MeNiel vs.
McNiel decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1922
and found at 61 Utah 141, 211 Pac. 988. In the case
of Livingston vs. Thornley decided by the Supreme
Court of Utah in 1929 and found at 74 Utah 561,
280 Pac. 1042, the Supreme Court was confronted
with a problem involving the right of one possessing
lands under purchase from the state to initiate and
prosecute to successful conclusion a trespass action
against a defendant who had permitted sheep to
trespass upon the land for which the plaintiff was
entitled to a certificate of sale from the state. The
court there said:

"* * * The presumption may well
be indulged that when the legislature by
its enactment, laws of Utah 1925, Chapter 31,
Section 5594, required that the purchaser of
state land shall pay interest on deferred payments from and after the date of sale, it was
the intention of the legislature that such purchaser should be entitled to possession of the
land purchased from and after the date of
purchase. The mere fact that the State Land
Board may delay in issuing a certificate of
sale cannot well be said to effect the right of
a purchaser to possession of the land purchased. * * *"
The Supreme Court thereby recognized the fact
that a purchaser even though he had not yet received
the certificate of sale could support the action of
trespass against trespassers upon lands which he
was purchasing from the State.
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In the light of the cases cited, there seems to
be no question but that Joseph Henshaw and his
successors, predecessors in title to the appellants,
were entitled to the possession of the lands described
in the certificate of sale No. 8515, from and after
the date of issuance thereof, January 1, 1905 (R.
51, Land Board Record, R. 106). Joseph Henshaw
and his successors in title, the predecessors in interest through which appellants claim were entitled
to the issuance of patent as well. The fact that they
failed to pay the taxes levied in the manner required
by law by the Beaver County Assessor, and otherwise failed to complete the requisite formalities required of them by the State Land Board by its
letters of July 8, and 14th, 1915 (R. 51) did not
reinvest the State of. Utah with the beneficial interest in this property since the State had received
full payment of all monies due it on the purchase
contract. The State was therefore left only the ministerial function of issuing patent. The interest of
the State had been disposed of in accordance with
law to a purchaser, to wit, Joseph Henshaw, and
it is through this purchaser that the appellants
claim. It having been established by the authorities
above cited that the appellants predecessors in title
were entitled to possession of the lands in question
and that they could have maintained an action to
evict a trespasser on the lands or ejected an unlawful claimant holding the lands, it logically follows
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that if the respondents held the lands adversly, hostily, continuously, uninterruptedly under claim of
right and paid all taxes lawfully levied thereon for
the statutory period they would acquire title by adverse possession which would cut off the rights of
the appellants and their predecessors in title. That
the respondents so held the lands is admitted by
stipulation. (R. 68, 69) and was so found by the
court (R. 106). The statutory period for establishing title by adverse possession is set by 78-12-5
DCA 1953 which was 104-12-15 in the 1933 and
1943 codes, at seven years. The requirements that
taxes be paid is created by 78-12-12 DCA 1953,
which was 104-12-12 in the 1933 and 1943 codes.
The attempt by appellants to save themselves from
this consequence by attempting to identify themselves with the State of Utah because patent had not
issued, we submit, must fail.
Not one authority cited by the appellants in
their brief holds that the interest of purchaser of
state lands under a State Land Certificate can not
be the subject of adverse possession. The authorities
are to the contrary. The authorities cited by the
appellant generally speaking involve an adverse action directed against the state involving lands which
had not been acquired under a certificate of sale or
purchased from the state. For example the appellant
cites the Van Wagoner vs. Whitemore case, 58 Utah
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418, 199 P. 670, decided by the Utah Supreme Court
in 1921 as determinative of the issues in this case.
We have no quarrel with the Van Wagoner vs. Whitmore case or any of the other authorities cited by
the appellant. They state the law and state it accurately. The appellant simply misapplies the same to
the factual situation involved in this case. The distinction between the Van Wagoner vs. Whitmore
case and the present situation is that George C.
Whitmore had been in open and notorious occupancy
and possession of the land in question prior to the
date on which the State of Utah was admitted to
the Union. He had inclosed the land with a fence
and made other ir.aprovements. At the time, that
the State of Utah was admitted to the Union a provision was incorporated into the law, whereby one
who was in possession of land then given to the
state by the Federal Government in grants in aid
of schools could make application and exercise preference rights for acquisition of title. Whitmore
did not take this action. Instead he sought to acquire the lands by claiming that he had held them
adversely to the State of Utah. The State in the
meantime sold the lands to Van Wagoner under a
proper application and selection in accordance with
the Utah Law. The issue in the Van Wagoner case
was not whether or not there could be an adverse
interest acquired against the purchaser of State
lands from the State but the question raised was
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whether or not Whitrnore by reason of his occupancy
of the lands prior to the acceptance of Utah into the
Union and his refusal thereafter to inaugurate the
necessary steps to acquire title by preference as
provided by law could hastily acquire title to this
land in an action against the State and thereby deprive the state of the revenue it was intended by
Congress it should receive. The Supreme Court held
that he could not do so.
We quote from the courts statement of the facts
in the Van Wagoner case, Page 671:
"It is an undisputed fact that George C.
Whitmore was in the open and notorious occupancy and possession of the land in question ever since long before Utah was admitted
into the Union. It is also undisputed that he
inclosed the land with a fence, made other
improvements thereon, such as the construction of water ditches, and that he cultivated
the land and produced crops thereon from
year to year. * * * and as to whether or not
he intended to hold adversely to the state,
which at the date of its admission into the
Union became the legal owner of the property,
does not appear, but for the purposes of the
discussion the fact may be admitted. * * *"
The Court then analyzes the applicable statutes
and particularly the statutes creating the limitation
on the action, being the san1e as are applicable to
the instant case, and points out at page 673 of the
opinion that everything necessary had been done
to comply with the Statute to create an adverse
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title against the State of Utah. The court says however, that such an end cannot be considered as having been the intention in the enactment of the statutes referred to and quotes with approval the case
of Murtaugh vs. C. M. & St. P. Rd. 112 N. W. 860
as being the correct interpretation of the statutes
in question at page 675 of the Utah opinion:
"We are, then of the opinion that, if the
statute under consideration must be construed
as authorizing the acquisition of title to the
school lands of the state by adverse possession, it violates in this respect not only the
terms of the grant, but also of the Constitution of the state. We are, however, of the opinion that the statute (referring to a statute
identical in all pertinent application to Utah
Statute 78-12-2) fairly may be given a construction which is consistent with the terms
of the school land grant and the provisions
of the State Constitution applicable thereto.
If the Statute be read in connection with the
general and well understood rule of law that
title to public land cannot be acquired by adverse possession, the history of our school land
grant, the nature of the title of the state to its
school lands and the mandates of our Constitution with reference to them, it is clear
upon the face of the statute that the Legislature did not intend to provide for the acquisition of the title to school lands by adverse
posession. We accordingly hold that title to
lands granted to the State of Minnesota for
the use of its schools by the United States
cannot be acquired by adverse possession, as
against the state."
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This language adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court from the Minnesota opinion clearly is limited
in its application to acquisition of title adversely to
the State.
In the case now before the Court, the State
of Utah did dispose of the lands in the manner required by law, not by adverse possession, and there
has never been any question raised but what the
funds paid by Joseph Henshaw to the State of
Utah for the acquisition of the lands represented
by Certificate 8515 were properly applied to the
purposes for which the lands were granted to the
state. In the Whitmore case, obviously had Whitmore been permitted to prevail in his hostile action
against the State of Utah and thereby achieve a
title without recognition of the ownership by the
State and without complying with the law of the
State of Utah for acquisition of title, the State
would have been deprived of the funds which it was
the intention of Congress it should have.
At Page 11, Appellants state in their brief refering to themselves:
"The State having accepted full payment
for the lands from the appellants and their
predecessors in interest is now honor bound
to execute its constitutional trust and issue
patent to the purchaser, his assignee or his
successor in interest."
The absurdity of the appellant's position is
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manifest in this statement. Appellants, at one and
the same time recognize that their only claim to
these lands is as a purchaser from the State and
they thereby admit the validity of the transaction
whereby the, right to patent was acquired from the
state. They then refuse to recognize that by virtue
of other applicable laws of the state, to wit, the tax
laws and the laws with respect to adverse possession, their rights as purchasers from the state might
be cut off by an intervening claimant such as Respondent in this case.
POINT II
UNDER UTAH LAW POSSESSION OF LANDS
CANNOT BE ADVERSE PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF
PATENT.

The Court erred in holding that adverse possession under State statutes of limitations commences to run not from the date of issuance of the
patent but from the date of final payment of the
State Land Certificate.
Respondent is not in accord with the position
taken by the appellants on this point. We respectfully submit to this court that the holding of the
lower court in regard thereto is sound and is in conformity with the established law. The position taken
by the appellants is neither sound or logical nor is it
sustained by the authorities cited by them.
It must first be remembered in connection with
the consideration of this point that the State of
Utah has been paid the full consideration charged
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for the land in question. (R. 17, 18, 51) Respondent1'
acquired its title to the land in question, under which
it claims, from Beaver County, which county had
acquired its interest in the lands by reason of sale
for delinquent taxes. (R. 51, Ex. 1 & 2, 106.) From
March 30th, 1914, date on which final payment
under the certificate of sale was made to the State,
until Respondent purchased the lands from Beaver
County under contract, June 5th, 1941, the lands
had stood from year to year on the delinquent tax
rolls of Beaver County and the county had been deprived of any revenue therefrom. (R. 17, 18, 106,
51 Ex. 1 & 2, and 68 & 69.)
The law relating to the Selection of State Land
is found enacted by Laws of Utah 1899 Chapter 64,
and with minor amendments, largely as to the price
to be paid therefore, comes to the 1953 Code basically unchanged as 65-1-32. It is admitted and found
by the lower court as a fact that the provisions of
the law with respect to the selection of the lands in
question by Joseph Henshaw, predecessor in title of
the appellants was complied with in all respects, and
that Certificate of Sale issued to Joseph Henshaw.
(R. 104 No. 8) The State Received payment in full
under the Certificate. (R. 17, 18) Accordingly by
the provisions of applicable law as now set forth
at 65-1-43 UCA 1953 Henshaw or his successors in
interest became entitled to patent upon the sur·
render of the original certificate of sale plus the
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payment of taxes due to the County as required by
the provisions of 59-2-2 UCA 1953. Under this state
of facts this court has already determined that the
transaction constitutes a sale of the lands in question and the purchaser is entitled to possession from
and after the date of purchase and before issuance
of the Certificate of Sale. Young vs. Corless, 56 U.
564, 191 P. 647, and Livingston vs. Thornley, 74
U. 516, 280 P. 1042.
The Utah Statute of Limitations found at 7812-2 & 3, UCA 1953 - [For text of sections cited
see appendices page 51] imposes a limitation upon
both the state and its patentees in the bringing of an
action to recover lands unless the claimant had been
in possession or received the rents and profits of
such land within 7 years from commencement of the
action.
It was admitted that appellants and their predecessors in title had not been in the actual possession of the lands in question at any time and that
they had never received any of the issues, rents or
profits thereof. (R. 68, 69)
The statutory bar would seem to be absolute
were it not for the doctrine announced in the case
of Van Wagoner vs. Whitmore, 58 Uta:h 418, 199
P. 670, if that case is applicable to the instant situation. We have previously under Point I analyzed
the Whitmore case in some detail and it is not our
purpose to again belabor the court on the distinction
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between the situation there confronting the court
and the situation in this case. We believe it suffices
to point out that because of the fact that the State
of Utah had not received the consideration which
Congress had intended it should receive for relinquishment of its interest in the school lands the court
adopted the position that such lands constitute trust
lands and the State could not have intended by the
enactment of the law referred to above, 78-12-3. DCA
1953, to deprive the people of the state of the benefits which Congress intended they should receive.
That reasoning has no application to the instant
situation because the state has received all to which
it is entitled. We believe the answer to the problem
lies in recognition of the fact as urged under Point'
I that the State is a nominal party in this action.
We again refer the Court to the citation from American Jurisprudence set out at pages 21 and 22 of
this brief as an excellent statement of the law applicable to the facts in this case.
To view this situation otherwise would give
to the appellants a preferred situation which they
would not have enjoyed had they complied with the
formalities required and the patent been issued. Can
it be then that by their own default they have insured themselves of a position where after the lapse
of more than forty years without the payment of
taxes, or the taking of possession, they can deprive
of title one who under claim of right has paid the
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taxes, has taken possession and improved the land?
We do not believe this is either law or equity.
Appellants in their brief chose to ignore a further grounds establishing the sufficiency of respondents title to the lands in question. It will be recalled by the court that the respondent claims under
a deed acquired from Beaver County, which county
in turn acquired its interest in the property through
tax sale (R. 51, Exhibits 1, page 11 and 12, 15 and
16; Exhibit 2, pages 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 & 30). We
have previously referred the court to the Utah Code,
Section 59-2-2, U.C.A~ 1953, which exists substantially in its present form in the 1898 code and the
1907 code, except for the provision that after final
payment has been made, the contract of sale for the
purpose of taxation should be considered as passing
title to the purchaser or assignee. This provision was
enacted by Chapter 113, Section 1 of the Laws of·
Utah 1919. The respondent makes claim as the holder
of a good and sufficient tax title from Beaver County
and in the lower court upon motion duly made and
by leave of the court, granted in open court, the
respondent filed a reply (R. 70, 71) in which respondent claimed the benefit of the statute of limita:tions, Title 78, Chapter 12, Section 7.1, 5.1, 5.2
and 5.3 U.C.A. 1953 as enacted by the laws of Utah
1951, Chapter 19, Section 1, et seq. ['The cited sections of the code are set forth in full in the appendices page 52-53] .
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The sections of the code referred to impose an
1
absolute bar to the maintenance of an action torecover possession or title to real property or to inter-'.··
1
pose a defense as against one claiming under tax
title unless the party so seeking to recover posses- i
sion or title or interpose the defense was in fact
possessed of the land within 4 years from the com- •
mencement of the action or within one year from I
the date of the enactment.
This court in the case of Hansen vs. Hansen 3 ~
Utah 2nd 310, 283 P. 2nd 884~ has upheld the validity and constitutionality of these sections of
the code. Since more than four years elapsed between the effective date of the statutes referred J
to and the commencement of this action, respondent J
claimed the benefit of the statute of limitations I
and the lower court in its memorandum decision
(R. 76) states:
"That the respondent by virtue of its
purchase of said lands from Beaver County
became entitled to possession and use of said
lands."
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law
( R. 102 through 107) the court made findings which
verified the validity of the respondent's claim to
the protection of the statutes referred to. No appeal ·
has been taken by the appellant from the findings
of fact made and entered by the lower court. With
respect to this matter appellants choose rather to
direct their entire attention to the contention, which
38
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

they raise, that respondent can not acquire any
rights prior to the issuance of patent. We submit
that the rights acquired by the respondent from
Beaver County were substantial rights, were recognized by the court below as a part of its decision.
We can not conceive of a more appropriate case in
which to apply the provision of the statute above
referred to than the instant case where the appellants and their predecessors in title have permitted
the lands in question to stand idle on the tax rolls of
Beaver County for more than 40 years and yet now
seek to come forward and assert title to the same.
We believe a short analysis of the cases cited
by appellants in support of their position on this
Point 2 may be helpful to the court.
We direct the courts attention to the quotation
appearing in appellant's brief at page 16, taken
from the case of Steele vs. Boley, 7 Utah 64, 24 P.
755.
"* * * We must hold that the District
Court erred in admitting evidence of adverse
possession by defendants prior to the issuing
of the patent to the plaintiff* * *"
Taken thus from the context one is given the
impression that this case does indicate that there
could be no adverse possession prior to issuance of
patent.
The case of Steele vs. Boley involved the question of whether the State Statutes of Limitations
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and adverse possession of lands for which the patent
had not yet been issued out of the United States
Government could result in the acquisition of an
adverse title against both the Federal Government
and its patentee. The Court at Page 755 of the
Pacific report of the case says :
"But since the former decision in this
court, the Supreme Court of the United States
had held that while the title to public land is
still in the United States, no adverse possession of it can, under state statute of limitations, confer a title which will prevail in an
action of ejectment in the court of the United
States against the legal title under a patent
from the United States. Redfield vs. Parks,
132 US 239, 10 Sup. Ct. 83. In that case the
court says : "It cannot be conceded that state
legislation can in that manner imperil the
rights of the United States or overcome the
general principle that it is not amenable to
the Statute of Limitations or the doctrine of
laches."
When viewed in the light of what the court
was actually considering it is seen at once that the
quotation taken out of context and put in appellants
brief has no significance at all in connection with
the problem involved in this case.
A similar misleading quotation is made by
appellants from the Toltec Ranch case at page 16
of appellants' brief.
"But counsel for the appellant insist that
the Statute of Limitations could only begin
to run from the issuance of patent, and tha~
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therefore, the defense of adverse possession
must fail. This position would be sound if
the legal title to the land had remained in the
United States until the patent was issued;
but such was not the case."
A different interpretation is derived when one
considers that the facts in the case disclose that
plaintiff was a grantee from the Central Pacific
Railroad Company and that the Central Pacific Railroad Company received the lands by grant from the
United States. On September 5, 1896, the Railroad
received its patent from the government and on
May 4, 1897 conveyed the land to plaintiff. The defendent and intervener had occupied the land since
1875 or 1876. The question was whether or not the
adverse possession, which was substantially proved
commencing long prior to the actual issuance of the
patent, would cut off the interest of the grantee of
the Railroad or whether such possession did not become adverse until issuance of patent. The court
said that the title passed long prior to issuance of
patent and that the patent was merely evidence of
compliance with the terms of the grant. The holding
is thus exactly to the contrary of the position for
which appellants cite the case. The court held that
the statute of limitations had run and that the
grantee of the patentee was barred. [For the full text
of the portion of the opinion from which the excerpt
quoted by Appellants was taken, see appendices
page 54-55] .
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This case, far from being hostile to the respondents position and supporting the position of
appellants for which it is cited, becomes in actuality
authority for the respondents and holds that even
in the case of United States Patents, adverse possession may commence in the State of Utah prior to the
issuance of patent, against a claimant who possesses
legal ti tie under grant. The parallel between that
situation and the one in the instant case is close,
and while the matter involves a United States Patent rather than State the principles applied in that
case are applicable to the case at hand.
We believe that since the appellants and
their predecessors in title were the parties entitle4
to possession under the Certificate of Sale issued b~
the State and enjoyed the rights as defined by the
court in the cases above cited, the adverse posses-·
sion of the respondents would, under the doctrine of
the Toltec Ranch case, cut the appellants off.
The same principles are again recognized in
the Utah Copper Co. vs. Eck11ULn case cited by appellants. In that case the Supreme Court cites with
approval the case of Boe vs. Arnold, an Oregon
case, 102 P. 290, which case held that,
"One claiming title to the land by adverse possession for the statutory period as
against all persons, but recognizing the superior title of the government may assert such
adverse possession as against any person
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claiming to be the owner under a prior grant
from the government."
It should be remembered that the Utah Copper
Co. vs. Eckman case 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178, involved an attempt to foreclose the interests of the
United States Government in a mining claim which
had not yet been patented. Since the only means by
which acquisition of title to a mining claim is by
patent from the United States Government, the
holding of a mining claim adverse to the claimant
prior to the issuance of the patent would obviously
avail one nothing because until the requirements for
issuance of patent had been met, the claimant had
nothing. When viewed in this light, the quotation
appearing at page 17 of the appellant's brief from
the Eckman case, becomes understandable and is not
in conflict with the holding of the lower court in the
instant case.
In view of the foregoing we respectfully submit
that the decision of the lower court on this point is
correct and should be sustained as in conformity
with both law and equity.
POINT III
THE COURT WILL NOT LEND ITS AID IN A
SUIT BASED ON A DEED ACQUIRED BY MALFEASANCE OF PUBLIC OFFICE.

The Court erred in holding that a quiet title
decree may be based on an official abuse of public
trust and malfeasance of office.
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We believe this point is presented to this court,
as in the answer filed in the court below, solely for
the purpose of confusing the issues. We submit that
there are no facts before this court which substantiate the unsupported allegation made in either the
Fifth Defense of the answer or appellants' brief of
malfeasance in public office by the Beaver County Commissioners in making sale of the lands
in question to Minersville Land and Livestock in the
year 1941. The respondent in the court below moved
to strike the fifth defense of appellant's answer.
( R. 50). By order dated the 15th day of September 1956, the court granted the motion to strike
the fifth defense from the answer. (R. 66) No appeal was ever taken from this order of the court.
No error is assigned in this appeal based upon the
court's order striking the fifth defense. Appellants
entire presentation consists of nothing more or less
than their own unsubstantiated statements attributing to these worthy men ulterior motives for the
transaction which was publicly conducted, made a
matter of public record and known about by virtually
all of the residents of the area and which has never
previously been subject to question from 1941 to the
present. Appellants' brief n1akes no mention of the
order of the court striking the Fifth Defense from
the answer. Appellants argue as though the alleged
misconduct were a proven fact and the lower court
a co-conspirator to breach the public trust.
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That the court was entirely justified in rejecting this scurrilous attack on reputable officials of
the County becomes apparent when one realizes that
the appellants must succeed, if at all in this action,
on the strength of their own title. They cannot prevail by pointing out a weakness, real or supposed
in respondents title.
"As frequently stated, the complainant's
right to relief depends upon the strength of
his own title, not upon the weakness· of the
title of his opponent. Having failed to establish title in himself, he cannot complain of insufficiency of the evidence upon which the
court adjudged title to be in the defendant."
44 Am. Jur. QUIETING TITLE, P. 69 Sec.
83.

The Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Dick vs. Roraker 155 U.S. 404, 39 L. Ed.
201, states the rule as follows:
"'The rule in ejectment is that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own
title and not on the weakness of the title of
his adversary. A like rule obtains in an equitable action to remove a cloud from a title,
and title in the complainant is of the essence
of the right to relief."
We further submit that the court below was
justified in its action in striking the fifth defense
in that the facts alleged as the basis for the defense
would constitute, even if proved, a collateral attack
upon the actions of these public officials.
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The actions of public officials are presumed, in
the absence of proof, to the contrary to have been
faithfully and properly performed.
"In the absence of any proof to the contrary there is a presumption that public officers have properly discharged the duties of
their office and have faithfully performed
those matters with which they are charged.
This presumption applies to Federal, State,
County and municipal officers * * *" 43 Am.
Jur. PUBLIC OFFICERS P. 254, Section
511..
The officials not being parties to this action,
would be powerless to defend themselves or to come
in and show the justification for their acts. The
actions of public officials are always subject to the
public scrutiny, but if they are to be called to task
is must be in a direct proceeding for the purpose,
not by way of a side attack in a proceeding to which
the official is not even a party.
\-__
"* * * It is frequently held that an officer is a. necessary party to a suit where it
is sought to pass on the validity of his acts.
* * * " 43 Am. J ur. PUBLIC OFFICERS P.
251-2 Sec. 507.
Under the Utah law if the public official was
to be called to account for his official conduct. The
action would have to be commenced within six years
from the date of the act complained of. See 78-12-24
UCA 1953. Can it be permitted to the appellants to
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sit idly by knowing of these acts committed by the
County officials and let 14 years go by and then seek
to raise them indirectly in a proceeding to which the
officials are not even parties? We submit this would
not only be inequitable, it is not the law. We believe
this court would be justified in striking from the
brief the appellants Point Three. Had the Fifth Defense of appellants been deemed pertinent by the
court below, and the issues raised therein been subjected to proof we submit that the facts proved
would have cleared the actions of these commissioners of wrongdoing. It is beneath the dignity
of this court to permit the presentation of such
an argument as that set forth in Point Three
of the appellants brief based solely upon innuendo
and the unsupported statements of the appellants'
counsel, with its inherent implication of complicity
by the lower court to accomplish an ulterior end.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ORDER THE STATE TO ISSUE PATENT TO
THE APPELLANTS AS PURCHASERS OF THE LAND
FROM THE STATE BUT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF PATENT.

The Court ,erred in refusing to order the State
to issue patent to appellants as purchasers of the
land from the State.
Since we believe we have established in the
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argument under Points 1 and 2, the respondents
title to the land in question, the narrow point here
involved seems to be whether the State should as a
matter of form issue patent to the appellants and
then the court make and enter its decree quieting
title against the appellants and recognizing the title
in the respondents by adverse possession and by acquisition of tax title. We believe that to issue the
patent to the appellants after the appellants rights
thereto, have been cut off by reason of the respondents intervening adverse possession and claim under
tax title would be an improper act and one which
does not give credence to the legislative intent as
expressed by the statutes relating to the taxation
of lands acquired from the State on certificates of
sale cited under our discussion of Point 1.
There has been a recent manifestion of this
legislative intent in the enactment in 1945 of 59-2-3
UCA 1953 which provides that the interest of a purchaser of state lands shall be assessed and the tax
collected thereon shall be collected as taxes on personal property, and that if sold for taxes a certified
copy of the tax sale when furnished to the land board
shall act as an assignment of the interest of the
original purchaser. [For full text see appendices
page 55-56].
The legislature here recognizes a tax sale may
cut off a purchaser's right to patent. In the in48
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stant case, we believe the notification of the State
by letter of respondents counsel bearing date of
April 21, 1955 and the conference therein referred
to (R. 51 Land Board Records, P. 37), constitutes
notice to the State Land Board of the rights of
Minersville Land and Livestock as purchaser of the
tax title from Beaver County. Certainly the joinder
of the State as a party defendant to this action
brought by respondents constitutes such notice. The
action of the State in refusing to issue patent to the
appellants as successors to the rights of the original
certificate holder, in the light of the impending litigation and the claims of the respondents seems entirely appropriate. The Answer filed by the Attorney
General on behalf of the State disclaiming any beneficial interest in the State and re-affirming the
State's intention to carry out its function imposed
by law with respect to the issuance of patent upon
determinina tion by the court of the party or parties
entitled thereto seems an entirely proper manner
to insure performance in conformity with the Revenue Laws and Laws relating to issuance of patent by the State.

49
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CONCLUSION
The Court below correctly decided the issues
presented. The judgment of the Lower Court should
be affirmed with costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
S. BOYDEN,
ALLEN H. TmBALS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

:JOHN
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APPENDIX
Excerpt from Appellants' brief, Page 2 & 3:
"The suit filed by plaintiff and respondent was not an action of trespass, nor a possessory action in the nature of ejectment,
nor a suit to have plaintiff declared to be the
present owner of the state land Certificate
No. 8515 as a successor in interest of Joseph
Henshaw, nor a suit alleging any right in
plaintiff to title and patent under the land
laws of the state by rights of purchase or
otherwise. It was a quiet title suit instituted
against the state and the holders of the certificate claiming ownership of the lands and
right to a patent under the statute of limitations by reason of payment of taxes and
of title (7 year statute) and for four years
adverse possession for seven years under color
under a tax title ( 4 year statute)."
78-12-2 UCA 1953:
Actions by the state: The state will not
sue any person for or in respect to any real
property, or the issues or profits thereof, by
reason of the right of title of the state to the
same, unless :
(1) Such right or title shall have accrued within seven years before any action
or other proceeding for the same shall be
commenced; or,
(2) The state or those from whom it
claims shall have received the rents and profits of such real property, or some part thereof, within seven years.
78-12-3 UCA 1953:
Actions by paten tees or gran tees from
state: No action can be brought for or in
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respect to real property by any person clain
ing under letters patent or a grant from th
state, unless the same might have been con
menced by the state as herein specified, j
case such patent had not been issued or grar
made.
"78-12-7 .1 U CA 1953 as amended - I
every action for the recovery or possef
sion of real property or to quiet title to or d€
termine the owner thereof the person estat
lishing a legal title to such property sha:
be presumed to have been possessed therE
of within the time required by law; an1
the occupation of such property by an:
other person shall be deemed to have bee1
under and in subordination to the legal title
unless it appears that such property has bee1
held and possessed adversely to such lega
title for seven years before the commence
ment of such action. Provided, however, tha
if in any action any party shall establisl
prima facie evidence that he is the owner Qj
any real property under a tax title held b~
him and his predecessors for four years prim
to the commencement of such action and on~
year after the effectiYe date of this amend·
ment he shall be presumed to be the owne1
of such property by adYerse possession unles!
it appears that the owner of the legal title 01
his predecessor has actually occupied or beer
in possession of such property under such 01
that such tax title owner and his predecessor~
have failed to pay all the taxes levied or assessed upon such property within such fow
year period."
"78-12-5.1 -No action for the recovel'J
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of real property or for the possession thereof
shall be n1ain tained, unless the plain tiff or
his predecessor was seized or possessed of
such property within seven years frorn the
commencement of such action; provided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses
brought or interposed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the
ownership of real property against the holder
of a tax title to such property, no such action
or defense shall be commenced or interposed
more than four years after the date of the
tax deed, conveyance or transfer creating
such tax title unless the person commencing
or interposing such action or defense or his
predecessor has actually occupied or been in
possession of such property within four years
prior to the commencement or interposition
of such action or defense or within one year
from the effective date of this amendment."
"78-12-5.2 - No action or defense for
the recovery or possession of real property
or to quiet title or determine the ownership
thereof shall be commenced or interposed
against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the
sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title
to any county, or directly to any other purchaser thereof at any public or private tax
sale and after the expiration of one year from
the date of this act. Provided, however, that
this section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal title to such
property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in actual possession
of such property within four years from the
commencement or interposition of such action
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or defense. And provided further, that thi,
section shall not bar any defense by a city o:
town, to an action by the holder of a taJ
title, to the effect that such city or town holdJ
a lien against such property whieh is equa
or superior to the claim of the holder of sue}
tax title."
"78-12-5.3 - The term 'arax Title" a1
used in section 78-12-5.2 and section 59-10-6[
and the related amended sections 78-12-5, 78·
12-7 and 78-12-12 means any title to rea:
property, whether valid or not, which ha~
been derived through or is dependent upoiJ
any sale, conveyance or transfer of such property in the course of a statutory proceeding
for the liquidation of any tax levied against
such property whereby the property is re·
lieved from a tax lien."
Full text of quotation from Toltec Ranch Co.
vs. Babcock:
"* * * but such was not the case. The
land in controversy constituted part of the
lands granted by congress to the Central Pacific Railroad Company. The original grant
was made by act of July 1, 1862 ( 12 Stat.
489) and the amount of the grant was en·
larged by the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat
356). The grant was one in praesenti, and
vested the legal title to the land in the railroad
company subject to some conditions relating
to the construction of the line of the railroad
and the identification of the lands. The lanru
which passed by the grant became identified
October 20, 1868, the date of the filing of the
map of definite location in the office of th1
Secretary of Interior. Tarpey vs. Madsen 1n
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U.S. 215, 20 Sup. Ct. 849 44 L. Ed. 1042.
Upon their identification, and the location and
the construction of the road, the title vested
in the grantee as of the date of the grant, and
the patent thereafter issued by the government was not essential to vest the legal right,
but it constituted evidence that the conditions
of the grant had been compiled with by the
grantee, and to that extent relieved the grant
from the possibility of forfeiture for failure
to comply with these conditions. The grantee
being thus vested with the legal title, had
the right to enter upon the land, occupy, and
use it after identification, the same as after
the patent had been issued. * * * The railroad
company having had, as we have seen the
legal title to the land in dispute at least from
time of filing of the map of definite location
with the Secretary of the Interior, and having
had the right to enter upon, occupy and use
the land, there would seem to be neither reason nor authority to hold that the statute of
limitations did not run against the company
and its grantee as well before as after the
issuance of the patent, and this even though
the intervener may have supposed her title
was subordinate to that of the United States;
for possession held in subordination to the
title of the government may be adverse to another claimant. Francoeur vs. Newhouse 14
Sawy. 600 (C. C.) 43 Fed. 236; 9 Am. Eng.
Enc. Law, 58; Hayes vs. Martin 45 Cal 559.
From the foregoing considerations, and from
a careful examination of the proof, we are
of the opinion that the intervener is entitled
to hold the land in controversy and the crops
raised thereon, by adverse possession, and
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that as against the plaintiff she has the abso1u te title thereto. (Italics ours)
59-2-3. DCA 1953-Collection of tax on
interest of purchaser-Certificate of saleEffect of filed certificate.-Any tax levied on
the interest of a purchaser of state lands before title passes to such purchaser or his assignee, shall be collected in the same manner
as taxes on personal property and the said interest shall be subject to sale for taxes in the
same manner as personal property.
Upon the sale of any interest, the officer
making such sale shall issue a certificate of
sale, and such certificate or certified copy
thereof, upon being filed with the state land
board, shall operate as an assignment of the
interest of the original purchaser or his assignee in said contract to the purchaser at the
tax sale.

56
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

